In July 2024, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued a soon-to-be-published opinion in Coreas Machado v. State, holding that it was constitutional error for the trial court to deny an objection and motion for mistrial when a law enforcement witness identified that the defendant was wearing shackles. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Facts of the Case
After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of 400 grams or more and sentenced to 20 years’ confinement. During the guilt/innocence phase of her trial, the State called a police officer to testify about the defendant’s arrest. When asked to identify “the full outfit that the defendant is wearing,” the police officer testified: “Green dress, shackles on the legs.” Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which was overruled.
Later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel spoke about the incident to the trial court judge: “ . . . I would suggest to the Court that that is a violation of due process. We do go through procedures not to show a defendant shackled or to have them put on trial in jail clothes or anything to indicate that they are in custody.” In response, the trial court reminded defense counsel that the motion was denied and suggested that in the future, the State could do a better job preparing its witnesses. The motion remained denied.
Arguments on Appeal
In her appellate brief, the defendant raised two issues: first, whether the court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to the police officer’s testimony about her shackles, and second, whether the court reversibly erred in failing to justify why defendant was shackled on the record. The defendant argued that her constitutional presumption of innocence, and thus her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, was violated by the officer’s comments.
The State, in response, argued that the defendant’s trial counsel failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he did not explicitly state grounds for the objection or ask for an instruction to disregard. Further, the State stated that harmless error analysis should apply, arguing that the record does not reflect that the jury was ever able to actually see that the defendant was shackled. The State also argued that it was defense counsel’s objection and not the police officer’s testimony that emphasized the shackles. Finally, the State argued that the defendant’s “shoddy credibility and weight of the State’s evidence” established her crime, not the shackles.
Court’s Opinion
First, the Court concluded that the issue was preserved for appeal. Although the defendant’s counsel did not explicitly state the grounds of the objection, the Court found that “the due process grounds . . . were apparent from the context, both in light of the circumstances and comments immediately preceding the objection and as further evidenced by the trial judge’s later comments . . . .”
Second, the Court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion for mistrial. Citing cases from the United States Supreme Court, the Court noted that it is a violation of a defendant’s due process rights to be visibly shackled in front of the jury unless there is “a special need.”[1] Further, under Texas case law, even if there is a reason for the defendant to be shackled, “the trial judge should make all efforts to prevent the jury from seeing the defendant in shackles.”[2] Because there was nothing in the record to reflect that the defendant needed to be shackled, and “no indication the trial judge made any effort whatsoever to prevent the jury from seeing [the defendant] in shackles,” the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion. Further, the Court held that this error was constitutional error because the jury was likely made aware of the shackles by the officer’s testimony.[3]
Preservation of Error
In Texas criminal cases, “the proper method of pursuing an objection until an adverse ruling is to (1) make an objection; (2) request an instruction to disregard; [and] (3) make a motion for a mistrial.”[4] Further, all objections must be both timely and specific, in order to give both the judge and opposing counsel the opportunity to take action.[5] Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1)(A), which governs the preservation of error for appellate purposes, states that an objection must state “the grounds for the ruling . . . with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.”
In Coreas Machado, defense counsel’s objection consisted of “Objection. Move for mistrial.”[6] However, the Court held that the objection was sufficiently preserved because the context of the trial and the judge’s comments showed made apparent that the grounds for the objection was due process.[7]
Shackles in the Courtroom
The use of shackles in the courtroom has been heavily litigated in both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Two important cases related to this topic are the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In Deck v. Missouri, a defendant was visibly shackled during a sentencing proceeding.[8] Deck’s trial counsel objected multiple times to the shackling, arguing that the jury could see the shackles and think that Deck is “violent today.”[9] On appeal, the Supreme Court first held “[t]he law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need.”[10] The Court outlined the historical reasoning behind this ban and then used the same reasoning to examine the consitutionality of shackling during a punishment phase.[11]
In so doing, the Court discussed three main considerations: 1) the presumption of innocence, 2) the right to counsel, and 3) the “courtroom’s formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defendants.”[12] After weighing these interests, the Court held that the latter two applied in a penalty phase.[13] And, while the presumption of innocence does not apply to a punishment phase, the Court still showed special concern that shackles would “almost inevitably affect[] adversely the jury’s perception of the character of the defendant” especially in a capital case, where the jury “determines whether a defendant deserves death.”[14] Thus, the Court held that “courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical restraints during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding” unless special circumstances apply.[15] Finally, the Court held that the burden is on the State to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”[16]
In Bell v. State, a defendant was shackled during his the guilt/innocence phase of his trial for possession of a controlled substance.[17] On appeal, he argued that the trial court judge committed reversible constitutional error in ordering him shackled.[18] Bell’s trial counsel objected to the shackles, contending if the jury saw or heard his shackles, he would be deprived of “a presumption of innocence, fair trial, ‘and his rights under United States and Texas Constitution.’”[19] The trial court overruled these objections.[20]
At the Court of Appeals level, Bell argued that the test articulated in Deck v. Missouri was proper.[21] The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that because there was no evidence that Bell’s shackles were perceived by the jury, Deck did not apply.[22] The intermediate appellate court found that even under a constitutional-error harm analysis, the error was harmless.[23] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Bell’s petition for discretionary review, stating that “the characterization of the trial judge’s error . . . is central to the court of appeals’ erroneous analysis.”[24]
When analyzing this case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the same three principles outlined in Deck.[25] The Court acknowledged that past cases emphasized “the primary concern in shackling error is the jury’s perception of the restraints and the ill effects it may have upon the defendant’s presumption of innocence” and that the Court’s precedent demonstrated “an appropriate unwillingness to [assume] that the jury perceived a defendant’s shackles.”[26] However, the Court held that “shackling error may rise to the level of constitutional error when the record reflects a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of the defendant’s shackles.”[27] Because there was not a reasonable probability in the record that the jury saw Bell’s shackles, the Court found that the error was not constitutional error.[28] However, the ruling in Bell changed the harm analysis for shackling in the courtroom in Texas.
[1] Coreas Machado v. State, No. 05-23-00174-CR, 2024 WL 3493261, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2024, no pet. h.) (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 629 (2005)).
[2] Id. (quoting Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
[3] Id. at *5.
[4] E.g., Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373, 375 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
[5] Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
[6] Coreas Machado, 2024 WL 3493261, at *1.
[7] Id. at *2.
[8] Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 625 (2005). Deck’s original death sentence was set aside by the Missouri Supreme Court; he was shackled during the new penalty phase. Id. (citing Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 432 (2002) (en banc)).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 626.
[11] Id. at 630.
[12] Id. at 630–31.
[13] Id. at 632.
[14] Id. at 632–33 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
[15] Id. at 633.
[16] Id. at 635 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
[17] Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 279–80.
[20] Id. at 280.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at 280–81.
[25] Id. at 281.
[26] Id. at 282.
[27] Id. at 283. The Court clarified that “reasonable probability” only requires “a substantial basis supporting a conclusion that the jury perceived the defendant’s restraints.” Id.
[28] Id.
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