State v. Villarreal

Background

In 2019, Defendant Juan Villarreal, a doctor, was charged with fourteen counts of sexual assault, allegedly of his former patients.  In 2022, Defendant filed a “Motion to Disclose and Designate Lost Evidence and Request for Hearing,” alleging the prosecution failed to disclose that two boxes of evidence were lost.  At the hearing, the prosecutor, who was at least the seventh assigned to the case, admitted “the State was unaware of what evidence remained lost” despite searching.

In January 2023, Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Based on Spoliation of Evidence and Violation of . . . The Richard Miles Act.”  After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.

Intermediate Appellate Court Case

The State appealed the motion to dismiss, citing the issue presented as “The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment with prejudice as a sanction for the State’s unintentional loss of evidence?”  First, in a lengthy footnote, the State argued that the motion to dismiss was filed under the cause number of an original indictment and not the current reindictment.  However, in the same footnote, the State conceded both that it filed a motion to dismiss under the original

  •  State v. Villarreal, 692 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2024, pet. filed).
  •  Id. 
  •  State v. Villarreal, 692 S.W.3d 844, 847–48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2024, pet. filed).
  •  Id. at 848.
  •  Appellant’s Brief (State’s Appeal) at 8, State v. Villarreal, 692 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2024, pet. filed) (No. 13-23-054-CR).
  •  Id. at 9 n.1.

cause number and that this argument was “a potential can of worms this Court may be reluctant to open.”  

In its brief, the State outlined the history of the case, detailing what it refers to as the “three lost-evidence motions.”  The State noted that the first two motions, the Motion to Disclose and Designate and a Speedy Trial/Michael Morton Act motion, were both heard but not ruled upon by the original judge in the case.  Then, a successor judge was appointed, who heard argument on and granted the third motion.

In a May 23, 2024, memorandum opinion, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment.  The Court reasoned that because it was unknown what the lost evidence boxes contained, the defendant could not prove that the evidence was exculpatory.  Further, the Court reasoned that dismissal was improper because the State no longer had possession, custody, or control of the lost evidence.  The Court also reasoned that Youngblood was the applicable legal standard in this case rather than Brady, “because it is uncontroverted that the State does not possess the desired evidence.”

Youngblood and Brady

Two oft-cited United States Supreme Court cases on this issue are Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In Youngblood, the Court held that a “suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police” is required for the failure to preserve evidence to be a Due Process violation.  Brady held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

  •  Id.
  •  Id. at 17.
  •  Id.
  •  Id.
  •  The Court issued a memorandum opinion on May 9, 2024, but then withdrew it and published the instant opinion after granting the State’s motion to publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
  •  Villarreal, 692 S.W.3d 850, n.7.
  •  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

Texas courts of appeal have written on the differences between Youngblood and Brady on several occasions.  In Moody v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained: “Although courts occasionally blur the distinction between Youngblood and Brady, Youngblood is properly applied to cases in which the government no longer possesses the disputed evidence, whereas Brady is properly applied to cases in which exculpatory evidence remains in the government’s possession.”

The Michael Morton Act

The Michael Morton Act, SB 1611, became law in 2013.  The act was named after Michael Morton, a man who was exonerated for the murder of his wife after spending 25 years in prison.  In Morton’s case, the prosecutor withheld evidence that pointed to his innocence.  The Michael Morton Act was codified as Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 39.14, and it expands on the requirement of Brady to mandate the disclosure of “material to any matter involved in the action and that are in possession, custom, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state.”  The defendant must timely request this evidence, and the State must provide it “as soon as practicable.”

The Richard Miles Act

The Richard Miles Act, H.B. No. 1125, took effect on September 1, 2021.  It amended the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to add article 2.1397, which mandates law enforcement to submit “a written statement by an agency employee with knowledge of the case acknowledging

  •  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
  •  Moody v. State, 551 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases).
  •  Cynthia Orr, The Michael Morton Act, Goldstein & Orr (June 11, 2014) https://www.goldsteinhilley.com/presentations-lectures/the-michael-morton-act/.
  •  Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 39.14(a) (emphasis added).

that all documents, items, and information in the possession of the agency that are required to be disclosed to the defendant in the case under Article 39.14 have been disclosed” to the prosecution.  This act also requires law enforcement to disclose additional evidence to the prosecution as it becomes available.  

Richard Miles was arrested when he was 19 years old.  After a jury trial, he was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 60 years in prison.  He was released in October of 2009 after 14 years in prison.  At Miles’ trial, the State’s case centered around one witness who had been present at the scene of the incident.  The witness heard shots fired and saw a Black man wearing “a white tank top, some dark shorts, and a black floppy hat” run away.  He claimed that he saw the man’s face clearly for “a second or two.”  At trial, he identified Miles as the shooter.  However, he later recanted his identification.

Miles’ fingerprints did not match fingerprints found on the scene.  Further, multiple witnesses submitted sworn statements saying that the shooter was wearing a t-shirt and long shorts.  However, Miles was wearing long pants, not shorts, when arrested.  A gunshot-residue test on Miles’ hands found “very low” levels of residue.  Public records requests and further investigation revealed two previously undisclosed police reports pointing to a different perpetrator.

On February 15, 2012, at the age of 36, Miles was exonerated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  He received $1,233,000 in compensation from the state and receives a

  •  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 2.1397(b).
  •  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 2.1397(c).
  •  Noelle Walker, Dallas Man Shares his Story for National Wrongful Conviction Remembrance Day, NBCDFW (Oct. 6, 2023) https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/dallas-man-shares-his-story-for-national-wrongful-conviction-remembrance-day/3351215/.
  •  Richard Miles, ACLU Texas https://www.aclutx.org/en/biographies/richard-miles.
  •  Ex parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
  •  Ex parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

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